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This document contains information referring to Projects:

OX CART .....

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12 January 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Briefing of Combined CIA Subcommittees of Senate  
Armed Services and Senate Appropriations - 11 January 1966

1. The Director, accompanied by John S. Warner, briefed the combined CIA Subcommittees of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations for approximately three hours beginning at 2:30 p.m. Present from the Subcommittees were:

Senator Richard B. Russell  
Senator Carl Hayden  
Senator John Stennis  
Senator Leverett Saltonstall  
Senator Stuart Symington  
Senator Milton R. Young  
William Darden, Professional Staff Member

There was a sweep of the room prior to the hearing and monitoring during the hearing. No transcript was taken.

2. The Director announced the appointment of Dr. R. Jack Smith as Deputy Director for Intelligence and the transfer, at his request, of the present incumbent, Mr. Ray Cline, to Germany.

3. Prior to the Director starting his briefing, Senator Symington stated he would like to make a very brief report to the Subcommittee on his discussions with Agency people in the field. From memory the Senator mentioned by name the people he had seen and where as follows:


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25X1 The Senator then stated that these were truly outstanding people who obviously knew their areas and their jobs. The Senator further stated that he inquired of the military commanders and Ambassadors about the work of the Agency. He stated uniformly he heard the Agency was doing a very competent job and were fully coordinated with other U. S. programs. He stated [redacted] there apparently had been some problem between the Ambassador and Chief of Station but the Ambassador assured him this had been straightened out. Senator Young joined in this general view stating he had made a similar trip about a year ago. Symington and Young then agreed that it is relatively easy to pick out the CIA man on the scene by simply looking for the most intelligent, knowledgeable, and personable man in the group. Symington requested the Chairman's permission to make a general statement on this subject on the floor of the Senate and the Chairman indicated no objection.

4. In response to a question as to our responsiveness to Ambassadors, the Director indicated our covert action programs were fully coordinated with the Ambassadors as well as receiving policy approval in Washington from outside the Agency.

5. The Director then briefed on the OXCART program following generally the attached briefing paper.

6. The Director then turned to South Vietnam and briefed in accordance with briefing notes. The question was asked about the Montangards and the Director indicated that while originally the Agency had responsibility for training and arming these people, this was now the responsibility of the military. He indicated that while this group was

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well disposed to the Americans, there had been difficulties with the Vietnamese government. The Director stated his belief that with careful handling by the South Vietnamese government these groups could be a valuable asset.

25X1 7. Senator Russell referred to the two most recent large-scale search operations by the American military where they were not able to locate significant groups of Viet Cong. His question was why the Agency, with the enormous amounts of money available to it, could not do a better job of infiltrating the Viet Cong in order to gain this kind of information. Senator Russell added that the Agency has not done as well in this as he would have expected. The Director reviewed the  program pointing out this had been extremely successful where they were located, adding that this effort would be tripled in the coming year. He also pointed out the problem is compounded by significant Viet Cong penetration of the South Vietnamese government and military. The Director further pointed out that this is a difficult task since penetration of the Viet Cong at a high level or intercept of COMINT of basic plans do not necessarily furnish the information needed at the tactical level since the isolated Viet Cong units act within the framework of broader plans and their precise movements are not necessarily known to higher headquarters. The Director stated this was a most difficult situation but was being worked at very hard by all concerned and that there was no simple answer.

8. The question was raised as to shipment of oil illegally through North Vietnam to be made available to South Vietnam. It was indicated there was no information on this. The question was asked as to bribery to permit oil trucks to move in South Vietnam. It was indicated that both of these items would be checked and information furnished, if available.

9. Senator Symington asked if we had a map which would show the antiaircraft dispositions. It was indicated this would be furnished to him.

10. It was indicated that we have an unconfirmed report that there are ChiCom advisors to the North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. Senator Russell added that he did not think they were really necessary since the North Vietnamese were doing all right on their own.

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11. A number of questions were then raised concerning what actions would bring the ChiCom forces into North Vietnam. The Director stated it was the considered view that any action which would threaten the existence of the North Vietnamese government would likely bring such ChiCom reaction. Senator Symington asked the specific question whether a small landing at Vinh would cause this reaction and the Director stated he believed it would.

12. In connection with Haiphong, the Director pointed out that it was not believed that taking out the two large oil reserves at Haiphong would trigger such reaction. In addition, he pointed out there were other ways of dealing with Haiphong such as blockade or mining. In response to a suggestion by Senator Russell, the Director agreed that the dredging operations in Haiphong, if interfered with, could probably accomplish the same results. The Director also noted that he was not including in his discussion of ChiCom reaction the question of taking out the various air fields in North Vietnam. Senator Symington stated he had heard the suggestion that as we phased out our B-47s they should be turned over to the ChiNats who could then use iron bombs on Communist China. The Director stated that this would certainly cause the Communist Chinese to react.

13. The Senators appeared to be building a case that any significant loosening of the reins on the military was blocked by the policy consideration that this would bring in the ChiComs but they did not pursue this thought further.

14. The Director then briefed in accordance with the briefing notes on the situation in North Vietnam including Shelepin's visit.

15. The Director gave the highlights of the briefing notes on the Dominican Republic, Indonesia, the Congo, Rhodesia, and India. In connection with the Dominican Republic, the Director was queried what would happen if the OAS forces were pulled out. He indicated there would undoubtedly be a blood bath followed by a military dictatorship. In connection with the Congo, Senator Russell asked about the releases from the reserve about which we had notified the Committee in writing.

[REDACTED] Senator Stennis commented that this seemed to be a good investment since he recalled that about two years ago many people were beginning to write the Congo off.

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16. Senator Symington asked when the ChiComs would attain their first missile capability and then expanded the question to include MRBMs and ICBMs. The Director stated that the ChiComs were currently working on a 1500 nautical mile cruise missile which would probably be available in 1968. He gave a figure of about 1970 for an MRBM and about 1975 for an ICBM. He stated, however, he would like to review this and furnish the Committee additional information.

17. In response to questions, the Director touched on very briefly the situation in the Philippines, Chile, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Uruguay, and Guatemala.

18. Senator Stennis and others commented that the Director had painted a rather gloomy picture. The Director stated he was reporting the facts as the Agency had developed them. Senator Symington stated that this had been one of the most informative and interesting afternoons that he had ever spent. The other members were very complimentary on the content and interest of the briefing.

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JOHN S. WARNER  
Legislative Counsel

Atts.

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Copies 2 & 3 - DCI w/atts  
Copy 4 - DDCI thru Ex Dir - w/atts  
Copy 5 - [redacted] w/o atts  
pp. 1 & 3 - DDP

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